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COMMENTS
Mineral Rights and Forced Pooling
The only geological concept considered by the courts in the
early formulation of mineral law principles was a somewhat
blurred notion of the fugitive nature of oil and gas.1 From this
belief developed the "law of capture,"'2 a rule that minerals were
incapable of being owned separately from the surface rights, and
would be subjected to ownership only when reduced to physical
possession. With this beginning, the courts followed the policy
that, since the minerals were likely to migrate from beneath a
particular tract of land, the interests of the holders of mineral
rights would best be served by prompt exploration, and the rules
of law were construed to reach that purpose. This judicial atti-
1. "The decisions of this court are . . . 'in accord with the general law' that
the fugitive minerals, oil and gas, while at large beneath the surface of the earth,
are not, and in their very nature cannot be, the subject of private ownership."
O'Niell, J., in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 770, 91
So. 207, 212 (1922).
2. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGiTs IN LOUISIANA 419 (rev. ed. 1949).
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tude has been appropriately termed the "policy of production."3
Although the rules were not entirely responsible for the ensuing
waste of the limited resource, 4 they were certainly conducive to
that end, and the waste led to the enactment of the present Con-
servation Act.5 This statute changed the legal attitude toward
mineral law from the "policy of production" to a "policy of con-
,servation." However, the legal rules formulated under the law
of capture were not supplanted by the Conservation Act, and the
task of the courts has been the onerous one of adjusting the old
rules to fit the new policy. This process of adjustment has been
particularly apparent in regard to the effect of forced pooling
provisions of the Conservation Act 7 on the rules of law applicable
to the prescriptive period of a mineral servitude and the primary
term of a mineral lease.
THE MINERAL SERVITUDE
The sale or reservation of minerals, separate and apart from
the surface ownership, results in the grant of the right to search
for the minerals and reduce them to possession. 8 This right is
classified'as being "in the nature of a servitude," and is subject
to the ten-year prescription liberandi causa of Article 789 of the
Civil Code. 10 The Code provisions applicable to servitudes allow
3. Summers, The Modern Theory and Practical Application of Statutes for the
Conservation of Oil and Gas, 13 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1938).
4. Boatner, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Louisiana, in
LEGAL HISTORY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS: A SYMPOsIUm (1938). In
speaking of the Rodessa Louisiana Field, the author states, at page 69: "[T]he
gas waste was terrific, approaching 600,000,000 cubic feet per day, an amount
equal to one-half the daily domestic consumption of natural gas in the United
States."
5. La. Acts 1940, No. 157, now LA. R.S. 30:1-20 (1950).
6. Summers, The Modern Theory and Practical Application of Statutes for the
Conservation of Oil and Gas, 13 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1938).
7. LA. R.S. 30:9B (1950) requires the Commissioner of Conservation, if he
finds it necessary to prevent waste and avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells,
to establish a drilling unit or units for each pool, and provides that the owners
may validly agree to pool their interests and develop their lands as a drilling unit.
Under R.S. 30:10A, if the parties fail to so agree, the Commissioner may compel
them to join their interests in a pooling unit. In the case of Smith v. Holt, 223
La. 821, 67 So.2d 93 (1953), the Supreme Court held that automatic pooling re-
sults from the creation of a drilling unit even in the absence of an order expressly
providing for forced pooling. Therefore, as far as the lives of the mineral inter-
ests on tracts affected by the order are concerned, forced pooling results from an
order which divides the land into units susceptible of legal identification. See
Lewis, The Effective Date of Forced Unitization Orders on Mineral Servitudes
and Leases, I LA. B.J. 31 (1954).
S. Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923) ; Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
9. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 20 (rev. ed. 1949).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 789 (1870) : "A right to servitude is extinguisheI by
the non-usage of the same during ten years."
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the running of the liberative prescription to be either inter-
rupted" or suspended.12 Good faith drilling on the tract of land
on which the servitude exists is held to be a user of the servi-
tude,18 and interrupts the running of prescription. 4 A suspen-
sion of prescription may occur when there is an obstacle prevent-
ing any exercise of the right to search.
Total Inclusion of a Tract Within a Unit
The concept of user is somewhat altered when a tract on
which a servitude exists is totally included within a forced pool-
ing unit. In such a case, either drilling on the tract or produc-
tion from a well located in the unit but not on the tract is a user
of the servitude and interrupts the running of prescription.
When the drilling occurs on the tract, there is an exercise of the
right to search as originally contemplated by the parties, and
therefore the prescription is interrupted. The reason for allow.
ing production from a unit well not located on the tract to inter-
rupt the prescription of the servitude on the tract is that a well
in a unit supposedly drains all the minerals underlying the tracts
which make up the unit, and therefore an actual use of the min-
erals occurs when they are extracted from under the land. Hence,
it is immaterial whether the operations are conducted on the land
burdened by the servitude or from without.1 6 An unproductive
well on one tract in the unit does not interrupt the prescription
of the servitudes on other tracts in the unit, for the dry hole con-
stitutes neither drilling on nor production from the other tracts
in the unit, and therefore is not a user of the servitudes on those
tracts.'7 A factor which has not been presented to the courts in
this regard is that when a forced pooling unit is established and
one person receives a permit to drill in the unit, the parties who
have working rights on other tracts in the unit have the oppor-
11. LA. CIviL CoD arts. 3516 et seq. (1870).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 792 (1870) : "If the owner of the estate to whom the
servitude is due, is prevented from using it by any obstacle which he can neither
prevent nor remove, the prescription of non-usage does not run against him as
long as this obstacle remains."
13. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LoUISIANIA 96 (rev. ed. 1949).
14. Hunter Co. v. Ulrich, 200 La. 536, 8 So.2d 531 (1942) ; Louisiana Petro-
leum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 135 So. 1 (1931) ; Keebler v. Seubert, 167
La. 901, 120 So. 591 (1929) ; Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
15. Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956) ; Smith v. Holt,
223 La. 821, 67 So.2d 93 (1953) ; Sanders v. Flowers, 218 La. 472, 49 So.2d 858
(1950) ; Ohio Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 28 So.2d 504 (La. App. 1946).
16. Boddie v. Drewett, 229 La. 1017, 87 So.2d 516 (1956).
17. Ibid. See also White v. Frank B. Treat & Son, Inc., 89 So.2d 883 (La.
1956).
1957]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVII
tunity to contribute to the drilling expense, their share depend-
ing on the proportionate amount their acreage bears to the unit
size."' If the owner of a servitude on a tract in a unit pays a por-
tion of the cost of good faith exploration in the unit, and the well
results in a dry hole, there is a question as to whether the contri-
bution to the drilling expense would be such an exercise of the
right to search as to warrant an interruption of prescription of
the servitude. Although such a contribution results in neither
drilling on nor production from the tract burdened by the servi-
tude, it is a bona fide attempt to extract the minerals underlying
the tract. As such, it should be held to interrupt the prescription.
The suspension of prescription due to an obstacle preventing
any exercise of the right has been urged infrequently, and usual-
ly without success. 19 A forced pooling order was mentioned as
such an obstacle in a prior case, 20 but Boddie v. Drewett,21 a 1956
18. According to LA. R.S. 30:10A(c) (1950): "In the event pooling is re-
quired, the cost of development and operation of the pooled unit chargeable by
the operator to the other interested owners shall be limited to the actual reason-
able expenditures required for that purpose, including a charge for supervision.
In the event of a dispute relative to these costs, the commissioner shall determine
the proper costs, after notice to all interested persons and a hearing."
19. In a footnote in Boddie v. Drewett, 229 La. 1017, 1023, 87 So.2d 516, 518
(1956), the court reviewed the jurisprudence concerning the suspension of pre-
scription due to an obstacle preventing user under Code Article 792: "In the fol-
lowing cases relief was denied on the ground that no obstacle existed to the exer-
cise of the mineral servitude: McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 722
(Art. 792 does not permit a landowner to suspend the prescriptive period by selling
his so-called reversionary interest in a mineral servitude which he previously im-
posed upon his land) ; Deas v. Lane, 202 La. 933, 13 So.2d 270 (the oversale of
minerals by a landowner is no obstacle to the exercise of a prior recorded min-
eral servitude) ; Gayoso v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677
(the lease by a landowner of his reversionary interest in the minerals prior to the
expiration of the servitude held no obstacle since the lease did not prevent the
mineral owner from using the servitude) ; Coyle v. North Central Texas Oil Co.,
187 La. 238, 174 So. 274 (where there is a purchase of minerals already subject
to a mineral lease, the lease is no obstacle to the exercise of the servitude) ; Gailey
v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (prior recorded mineral lease on land upon
which mineral servitude is subsequently created does not constitute an obstacle) ;
Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (held no obstacle where land-
owner in selling minerals reserved the power to lease and the right to receive
bonus and delay rentals therefor) ; Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La.
1044, 81 So.2d 389 (filing of jactitation suit by landowner no obstacle to use of
servitude since mineral owner always had free access to the land for exploration
purposes). But see White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433, holding that an
oversale of minerals by a landowner became a mineral servitude on the date on
which liberative prescription returned the minerals to the owner and that the
existing servitude operated as an obstacle to the running of prescription on the
after-acquired servitude."
20. Sanders v. Flowers, 218 La. 472, 498, 49 So.2d 858, 867 (1950) : "The
conclusion we have reached in this case necessarily reflects that we have given
consideration to this question, and whether the order of the Commissioner unitizing
the area had the effect of suspending the running of prescription by placing an
obstacle to drilling on defendants' property . . . is immaterial in this case."
21. 229 La. 1017, 87 So.2d 516 (1956).
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decision, was the first actually to hold that the pooling order may
suspend prescription. There it was held that when a drilling unit
is formed and a certain space within the unit is designated as the
permissible drilling area, there is a suspension of the running of
prescription of a mineral servitude on a tract of land which is
located within the unit but not within the drilling area. The rea-
son assigned for allowing the suspension is that in such a case
the order of the commissioner creating the unit presents an ob-
stacle to any exercise of the servitude, and the prescription
should not be allowed to run against an owner of a mineral servi-
tude who is prohibited from exercising his right to search. The
suspension runs from the date of the order creating the unit and
lasts until the obstacle is so removed that "[proceedings may be
initiated] for the allowance of drilling in areas theretofore pro-
hibited by the order. ' 22 The Boddie case is sound in that it recog-
nizes the principle that one who is prevented from exercising a
right should not be penalized for any failure to do so. However,
the decision is subject to some criticism in that the beginning of
the suspension is fixed at the date of the issuing of the unitiza-
tion order, whereas the obstacle does not actually exist at that
time. Even though a tract is not located within the permissible
drilling area, the owner may apply to the Conservation Depart-
ment for a permit to begin explorations within the drilling area.
Therefore, the creation of the unit actually presents no obstacle
to the exercise of any right to search. However, once a drilling
permit has been issued, an obstacle is presented to the exercise
of any servitude on tracts in the unit other than the one on which
the drilling is to take place, and the prescription should be held
to be suspended.
Partial Inclusion of a Tract Within a Unit
In the 1956 case of Childs v. Washington8 it was held that
when only part of a tract on which a mineral servitude exists is
included within a forced pooling unit production from a well in
the unit but not on the tract does not interrupt the prescription
of the servitude on that part of the tract which lies outside of
the unit. The reasoning of the opinion is that even though the
Civil Code provides that a servitude is indivisible,'24 and a min-
22. 229 La. 1017, 1026, 87 So.2d 516, 519 (1956).
23. 229 La. 869, 87 So.2d 111 (1956).
24. LA. CIvL CODE art. 656 (1870) : "The rights of servitudes, considered in
themselves, are not susceptible of division, either real or Imaginary."
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eral servitude has been held to be indivisible,25 it has also been
held that there is nothing which prevents the parties who created
the right from entering into a contract whereby a division of the
servitude results.26 Since the parties could divide the servitude,
the orders of the Commissioner of Conservation could have the
same result. The rule of Childs decision was re-affirmed in the
case of Jumonville v. The Federal Land Bank of New Orleans,27
in which the court observed that the order of the Commissioner
was never intended to have any effect on the mineral interests
on tracts outside of the boundaries of the unit which it created.
The result reached by the decisions is equitable and finds ample
support in the jurisprudence. However, it is submitted that the
reasons for the decision could have been placed on a sounder
basis. In dealing with the concept of the divisibility or indivisi-
bility of a servitude, there is a great deal of uncertainty. Al-
though the contracting parties are allowed to divide a servitude,
there is no assurance as to when an outside element may create
such a division. What is really meant in considering the concept
of divisibility is that when the exercise of the right is accom-
plished in a real sense, that is, in a manner contemplated by the
original grant, then the effects of such an exercise should extend
to the entire right, and the prescription should be interrupted as
to the entire servitude. However, when the exercise of the servi-
tude is done in a manner other than that contemplated by the
parties, since there is no user in a real sense, the prescription
should be interrupted only as far as the effects of the exercise
extend, and the servitude should be divided into that part on
which the interruption occurs, and that part to which the inter-
ruption does not extend.
This is the position taken by Justice McCaleb in his concur-
ring opinion in the Childs case. 28 According to his thesis, a pro-
ducing well in a unit drains all the minerals from a sand under-
lying the unit. Therefore, any production from a well in a unit is
production from the individual tracts which make up the unit
25. Frost Lumber Industries v. Republic Production Co., 112 F.2d 462 (5th
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 676 (1940) ; Lenard v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La.
265, 29 So.2d 844 (1947) ; Hunter Co. v. Ulrich, 200 La. 536, 8 So.2d 531 (1942);
Patton v. Frost Lumber Industries, 176 La. 916, 147 So. 33 (1933).
26. Elson v. Mathewes, 224 La. 417, 69 So.2d 734 (1953). See Daggett, Brief
Comment and Speculation re Bison v. Mathewes, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 547(1954). See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34 So.2d 746 (1947);
Byrd v. Forgotson, 213 La. 276, 34 So.2d 777 (1947).
27. 87 So.2d 721 (La. 1956).
28. 229 La. 869, 881, 87 So.2d 111, 115 (1956).
438 [Vol. XVII
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and, being an actual use of the minerals underlying the tracts,
interrupts the prescription of the servitudes on those tracts.
However, when a tract of land affected by a mineral servitude
is included only partially in a unit, and a producing well in the
unit is not located on the particular tract, since "no drilling ex-
plorations [are] ever conducted on any part of the land subject
to the servitude, '29 there is no user of the servitude in a real
sense on those tracts on which the drilling does not occur, for
the use is not done in the manner contemplated by the original
grant. Therefore, since the prescription was interrupted only
because of the inclusion of the tract in the unit, and not by means
of any exercise of the right to search on the tract, this inter-
ruption should extend only as far as the drainage actually occurs,
that is, to the boundaries of the unit. Since there is an interrup-
tion of the prescription of the servitude on only a portion of the
tract, the result is to divide the servitude. In other words, the
division of the servitude is a result of the court's decision rather
than a reason for it.
The reasoning of the concurring opinion is more sound in that
it is more consistent with the intentions of the parties and the
policy of conservation. If a servitude were divided every time
that a unit included only a portion of the tract on which the right
existed, then a situation might arise wherein a person would
have to exercise his right to search more than once to effect an
interruption of the prescription of the entire servitude. For in-
stance, if a tract of land subject to a mineral servitude was in-
cluded only partially in a unit, and a producing well was drilled
on that part of the tract in the unit, the exploration would not
be considered an exercise of the servitude on that portion of the
tract lying outside of the unit because the effect of the unit would
be to divide the servitude. The reasoning of the concurring opin-
ion would reach a different result in that since the drilling took
place on the tract on which the servitude existed, the exploration
is a "user of the servitude in a real sense, '3 0 and there should be
an interruption of the prescription of the servitude on the entire
tract. Such a result would provide a better reconciliation of the
interests served by the conservation policy and the rights as orig-
inally created by the parties in that exercise of the servitudes on





the drilling within the unit on servitudes on those parts of tracts
lying outside of the unit would be more consistent with the inten-
tions of the parties.
THE MINERAL LEASE
The usual method of developing properties for oil and gas is
through the medium of the mineral lease.81 The typical lease is
granted for a fixed period, generally called the primary term,
during which the lessee has the right to conduct drilling opera-
tions on the land. If production in commercial quantities is se-
cured during the primary term, the lease is maintained in force
and effect for at least as long as the production continues. Un-
like the mineral servitude, the primary consideration for the
granting of a mineral lease is the development of the land for
oil and gas. 32 Therefore, a mineral lease is not maintained be-
yond its primary term by unsuccessful drilling; it is necessary
that the explorations be commercially productive, "affording the
lessee a net profit and the lessor an adequate consideration.. 33
Total Inclusion of a Tract Within a Unit
One of the early problems litigated under the present Con-
servation Act was whether the life of a mineral lease on a tract
of land totally included in a forced pooling unit is extended be-
yond its primary term by production from a well located else-
where in the unit. It is now well established that production
from a well in the unit is production under the terms of the min-
eral leases on all of the tracts in the unit even though there is
no actual drilling on every single tract of which the unit is com-
prised.3 4 This result is based on the fact that even though a
lessee might not actually conduct drilling operations on a partic-
ular leased tract, there is an actual drainage of the minerals
underlying the tract, and the lessor receives a share of the royal-
ty payments.
31. Brown, Elemental Principles of the Modern Oil and Gas Lease, A.B.A.
SECTION ON MINERAL LAW 146, 154 (1955) ; Moses, The Evolution and Develop-
ment of the Modern Oil and Gas Lease, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND
GAS LAW AND TAXATION 1 (1951).
32. Melancon v. The Texas Co., 89 So.2d 135 (La. 1956); Wier v. Grubb,
228 La. 254, 82 So.2d 1 (1955) ; Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So.
314 (1926).
33. Wier v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 268, 82 So.2d 1, 6 (1955).
34. Hunter v. Vaughn, 217 La. 459, 46 So.2d 735 (1950) ; Crichton v. Lee,
209 La. 561, 25 So.2d 229 (1946) ; Hardy v. Union Prod. Co., 207 La. 137, 20
So.2d 734 (1945). See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 445 (1952) for a
discussion of these cases.
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Whether the creation of a forced pooling unit has the effect
of "suspending" the primary term of a lease on a tract in the
unit which does not lie within the permissible drilling area is an
open question. An analogy to the Boddie case, which held that
the prescription of a mineral servitude is suspended when a unit
presents an obstacle to the exercise of the servitude, cannot be
drawn too closely because the decision was based on a Code ar-
ticle dealing with servitudes, and there is no provision in the
Code for suspending the term of a lease.3 5 A provision in a lease
contract which could be held to cover the situation is the force
majeure clause, 6 which may provide that when any cause beyond
the lessee's control prevents him from drilling, there is a suspen-
sion of the obligation to drill, and the time during which the
lessee is prevented from drilling is not counted against him.8 7
However, as a practical matter, the pooling of land in which the
lessee has an interest is not usually done without his participa-
tion or acquiescence, and therefore such unitization should not
be held to be a cause which is beyond the lessee's control. Any
obstacle which would arise due to the pooling of the leased tract
would be self imposed, and ought not to be held to suspend the
primary term of the lease so as to allow a greater time during
which the lessee may exercise his right to drill.
Partial Inclusion of a Tract Within a Tract
The lessee's obligation to drill established by a mineral lease
is indivisible in nature, and therefore the securing of production
from any part of the leased tract has the effect of satisfying the
obligation to drill as to the entire leased tract and will maintain
the entire lease beyond its primary term.88 In the case of Hunter
35. See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1933(2), (3) (1870), concerning damages when
the obligor is prevented from performing because of a fortuitous event or irresistible
force.
36. See Brown, Elemental Principles of the Modern Oil and Gas Lease, A.B.A.
SECTION ON MINERAL LAW 146, 156 (1955).
37. An excerpt from a typical mineral lease: "It is further agreed that should
Lessee be prevented from complying with any expressed or implied covenants of
this lease, from conducting drilling . . . thereon . . . by operation of force majeure,
any federal or state law, or any order, rule or regulation of governmental au-
thority, or other cause beyond Lessee's control, then while so prevented, Lessee's
obligation to comply with such covenant shall be suspended ... and this lease shall
be extended while and so long as Lessee is prevented by any such cause from
conducting drilling . . . or from producing oil, gas or other minerals from the
leased premises, and the time while Lessee is so prevented shall not be counted
against Lessee." (Emphasis added.) See Hunter v. Vaughn, 217 La. 459, 46 So.2d
735 (1950).
38. Cochran v. Gulf Refg. Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916) ; Murray v.
Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
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v. Shell Oil Co.89 it was held that the conservation orders do not
have the effect of dividing the obligation to drill under a lease
by including only a portion of the tract in a forced pooling unit
and, therefore, production in paying quantities from a well in
the unit, even though not located on the leased premises, is com-
pliance with the obligation to drill and extends the life of the
entire lease beyond its primary term.40 One reason underlying
the decision is that if the conservation orders were allowed to
divide the lease, a producing well drilled on that portion of the
tract located in the unit would have no effect on the primary
term of the lease on that part of the property lying outside of
the unit, and a situation would arise in which the lessee would
have to drill two wells in order to fulfill his original obligation,
one within the unit and one outside the unit. Another reason for
the decision is that even though the production from the unit
maintains the entire lease beyond its primary term, the lessee is
under a further obligation, either express or implied, to adequate-
ly develop the remainder of the tract, and upon a failure to do
so, the lessor can maintain an action for cancellation or reduction
of the lease.41 The Hunter decision was affirmed in the case of
LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil Co.,42 wherein it was shown that the re-
sult is based entirely on the indivisibility of the obligation to drill
and not on any idea that the conservation orders were intended
to produce such a result.
39. 211 La. 893, 898, 31 So.2d 10, 12 (1947). According to the opinion, "the
only issue presented . . . is: When an oil and gas lease covers land both within
and without a drilling unit pooled by order of the Commissioner of Conservation
during the primary term of such lease, and when production in paying quantities
is secured while such lease is in effect by payment of delay rentals from a well
within the pooled unit but not on any portion of the leased land, does such pro-
duction maintain the lease in effect beyond its primary term as to the part of
the land leased which lies outside such unit?"
40. In a dissenting opinion in the Hunter case, Justice Hamiter posed the fol-
lowing hypothesis: "[11f a lease contained 1000 acres and only one acre hap-
pened to be placed within a unit and no well was drilled on that particular acre,
nevertheless, the entire 1000 acres would be held indefinitely beyond the primary
term but would share in only 1/640th x 1/8, or 1/5120ths of the production from
the unit. Such a result as this makes it obvious that neither the Legislature nor
the Commissioner intended any such thing." Id. at 911, 31 So.2d at 17.
41. In the case of Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So.2d 111 (La. App. 3954),
the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, granted this remedy to the lessor. It was
held that even though a mineral lease is maintained beyond its primary term by
production from a forced pooling unit of which the leased tract forms a part,
the lessee is still under an obligation, either express or implied, to develop ade-
quately the remainder of the leased tract, and that any failure to do so would
result in a cancellation of the lease on that part of the tract lying outside of the
unit. See Note, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIE W 853 (1955).
42. 218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950).
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As a technical legal proposition, the Hunter and LeBlanc de-
cisions seem to be sound. However, from a practical standpoint,
the remedy which is given to the lessor is circuitous and ex-
pensive, and the decisions have therefore met with considerable
criticism. 43 The burden of proof in showing that a prudent oper-
ator would have developed the property is onerous in that the
pertinent geological information is more accessible to the lessee
than to the lessor.44 Even though the law gives the lessor an
award of a reasonable attorney's fee and any damages he may
have incurred from his inability to release the land,45 the gamble
in bringing such a suit is greater than the average lessor can
afford.
In dicta in the LeBlanc case, the Supreme Court has said that
a different result could have been reached in the Hunter and Le-
Blanc cases had different kinds of lease contracts been involved.46
The Hunter lease came into existence prior to the present Con-
servation Act, and made no mention of pooling.47 Similarly, the
LeBlanc lease, even though granted after the enactment of the
Conservation Act, had no pooling clause.4 8 However, a different
43. In THE CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY 248 (Louisiana
chapter) (1948), the author states in connection with the Hunter decision: "From
a practical standpoint the right to rescind a lease for failure to adequately de-
velop is a circuitous and expensive remedy for the average lessor. In view of the
expressed desire of the court in previous cases to prevent a tying up of valuable
mineral property and circuity in litigation, the court (in the interest of public
policy) might have found a means of giving the lessor relief without leaving the
matter to be corrected by legislative action." See also Daggett, The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term - Mineral Rights, 8 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 212, 216 (1948) ; Lewis, Recent Developments in Pooling and Uniti-
ration, A.B.A. SECTION ON MINERAL LAW 11 (1955) ; Meadors, What Legislation,
If Any, Is Desirable, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 145 (1954).
44. In an attempt to ease this burden, courts have held that, in spite of com-
petent geological testimony on the part of the lessee that exploration would be un-
successful, cancellation of the lease is proper if the lessor can show that he has
been assured by a third party that there will be drilling, Romero v. Humble Oil &
Refg. Co., 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952), or even that the lessor has received an
offer for a lease, Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., 229 La. 349, 86 So.2d 62 (1956).
45. LA. R.S. 30:102 (1950) : ". . . If a lessee, having been given written notice
demanding cancellation of the lease, fails or refuses to comply within ten days, he
shall be liable to the lessor for a reasonable attorney's fee incurred by the lessor
in bringing suit to have the cancellation adjudged. He shall also be liable to the
lessor for all damages suffered by him by reason of his inability to make a lease
because of the non-cancellation." This statute has been held to apply to a suit for
cancellation of a portion of a leased tract lying outside of a forced pooling unit,
Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., 229 La. 349, 86 So.2d 63 (1956).
46. LeBlanc v. Danciger, 218 La. 463, 470, 49 So.2d 855, 857 (1950) : "Had
[the contracting parties] intended any action in pursuance to such provisions
segregating and placing only a portion of the leased property in a pooling unit to
have the effect of dividing the lease, they could have so stipulated in their contract."
47. See Conveyance Book 108, p. 425, Records of DeSoto Parish. There are
actually two leases, one Bath's Form 10 and the other the Form 15.
48. The contract is registered in Lease Book 43, Folio 198, St. Landry 'Parish.
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kind of lease was involved in the federal case of Smith v. Carter
Oil Co. 49 There the plaintiff sued for cancellation of a portion of
a lease on property which lay outside of a forced pooling unit on
the ground that there had been no drilling on the tract during
the primary term of the lease. The lease provided that in the
event it became necessary to establish a unit in accordance with
governmental orders, the lessee could pool any portion of the land
under contract, but that only the term of the lease on the portion
of the tract which was included in the unit would be continued by
production from a well on other property in the unit.50 The court
held that since the pooling had not been accomplished by the
lessee, but was done by the Conservation Department, the lease
provision had no application, and the principle of the Hunter
case should apply. That the decision seems to be contrary to the
intentions of the parties is shown by the fact that the lessee paid
the delay rentals on the part of the tract which lay outside of the
unit even after the producing well was brought in on the unit,
thereby indicating his belief that the production from the unit
did not have the effect of maintaining the entire lease beyond its
primary term.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to
determine the effect of such a provision in a lease on property
which lies partially within and partially without a forced pooling
unit. The dicta in the LeBlanc case"' indicates that such a pro-
vision in the contract would allow the production from the unit
to affect only that part of the lease on the tract included in the
unit. There is no reason why the pooling provision in a lease
should have any effect on a forced pooling unit different from
that on a voluntary pooling unit. It would appear that such a
49. 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952).
50. Pertinent provisions from the lease contract: "If . . . lessee in its opinion
deems it advisable and expedient, in order to form a drilling unit or units to con-
form to regular or special spacing rules issued by the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion . . . lessee shall have the right, at its option, to pool or combine the lands cov-
ered by this lease . . . with other land . . . in the immediate vicinity. . . . Lessee
shall execute in writing and record in the conveyance records of the parish in which
the land herein leased is situated an instrument identifying and describing the
pooled acreage. . . . If operations be conducted on or production be secured from
land in such pooled unit other than land covered by this lease, it shall have the
same effect as to maintain lessee's rights in force hereunder as if such operations
were on or such production from land covered hereby, except that its effect shall
be limited to the land covered hereby which is included in such pooled unit." (Em-
phasis added.) See 104 F. Supp. 463, 466 (W.D. La. 1952), for a quotation of this
paragraph of the lease in full. Cf. paragraphs 12 and 13 of Bath's Form 549-R-1
lease.
51. See note 46 supra.
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provision in a lease should allow the pooling of a portion of the
land subject to the mineral lease to affect the primary term of
the lease only insofar as the property is included in the unit. This
would afford a better remedy to the lessor than the circuitous
and expensive one left by the Hunter decision and would be more
consistent with the original obligation of the lessee. It would
also answer the argument that the lessee might have to drill two
wells in order to satisfy his obligation, for such a pooling clause
in a lease could provide that if the well in the unit is located on
the leased property, then the life of the entire lease is continued
for the duration of the production.
CONCLUSION
The effect of a forced pooling unit on the laws relating to
mineral leases and servitudes as formulated under the rule of
capture has resulted in a change in the manner by which the right
to search may be exercised. When a tract on which a mineral
servitude or lease exists is included in a unit, it is no longer
necessary for explorations to occur on the tract in order for the
right to search to be exercised, for production from a well any-
where in the unit is considered an actual use of the minerals
underlying each tract of which the unit is comprised and is con-
sidered to be an exercise of the right to search on each tract.
The different results reached in the case of a mineral servi-
tude and a mineral lease when a tract on which the right exists
is included only partially within a forced pooling unit can be
justified on the grounds of the difference in the nature of the
rights. However, as a practical matter, the different results will
cause some difficulty. If an owner of a servitude on a tract
which lies only partially in a forded pooling unit should lose his
right, then any lease which depends on this right will also fall.
In such a case, continued exploration on that part of the tract
lying outside of the unit would be to the mutual benefit of both
the servitude owner and the lessee. However, if the lessee should
derive his right from two parties, a landowner who has a frac-
tional interest in the minerals, and a servitude owner who has a
right to the other portion of the minerals, then it would not be
necessary for the lessee to continue any exploration in order to
maintain his right, whereas it would be necessary for the owner
of the servitude to exercise his right to search in order to keep
his right in existence. In such a case, the only remedy available
1957]
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to the owner of the servitude is an enforcement of the adequate
development covenant, and this is almost impossible due to the
fact that it could not be enforced prior to the expiration of the
primary term of the lease, but would have to be enforced be-
fore the accrual of the prescription on the servitude. Another
fact that would make the remedy less available to the servitude
owner is that he would have to show that he had received a bona
fide offer of lease from a third party, and it would be difficult
for him to secure any such contract in view of the fact that he
owns only a fractional portion of the mineral rights. Such a re-
sult is indicative of the myriad problems with which the court
has been faced in construing the laws formed under the rule of
capture to fit the conservation policy. In spite of the reluctance
of the court to overturn any prior mineral law decision due to the
fact that they establish rules of property, it is apparent that a
reconsideration of the Hunter-Shell decision is necessary.
John B. Hussey, Jr.
Tax Consequences from Dispositions of Carved Out
Oil Payments - Ordinary Income or Capital Gain?
Classification of a particular item of income as either ordi-
nary income or capital gain is a matter of considerable concern
in terms of the amount of tax to be paid. One source of income
which has posed a difficult problem in regard to its nature for
income tax purposes is the "oil payment." For federal income
tax purposes, an oil payment' has been defined as a right to oil
and gas in place that entitles its owner to a specified fraction of
his transferor's share of production from the property, limited
by a certain sum of money or a specified number of units of oil
or gas. 2 Oil payments are used extensively in the industry, there-
by making the classification of income from transfers of such
payments particularly important.
The problem of distinguishing between ordinary income and
capital gain is not a new one, nor in many areas has it been ade-
1. BREEDING & BURTON, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INCOME 25 (1954).
2. The law relative to gas payments is the same as that relative to oil pay-
ments. For the sake of simplicity, references in the text will mention only the
oil payment; however, the discussion is equally applicable to gas payments.
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